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High Speed Research 
FORUM 
AN OWRWEW OF THE DEMISE OF NASA's HIGH SPEED RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Randolph S. Reynolds 
ABSTRACT 
In February 1998 NASA's High Speed Research Program (HSR) was cancelled without fan fare or press 
announcement. The principal effect of this announcement was to immediately end the research and development that 
was in progress on the revised supersonic transport or High Speed Civil Transport (HCST) project. This research was 
to lead to a prototype supersonic transport that would begin flying by the end of the first decade of the 2 1 Century. 
The factors for the cancellation of this program were never made clear other than the competing funding of the 
International Space Station. NASA's budgetary squeeze fiom the rising cost of the Space Station was and continues 
to have a negative impact on NASA's aeronautics programs. 
This paper discusses the technical objectives of the HSCT research that were in progress at the time and the 
potential for breakthroughs in several areas that would have made a nationally funded prototype supersonic transport 
a possibility. 
HIGH SPEED RESEARCH 
Speaking to the U.S. Air Force Academy graduating class 
of 1963, President John F. Kennedy announced the federal 
government was going to sponsor a supersonic transport to 
become operational in the U.S. air carrier fleet. Three issues 
dominated this project. The first was the technological basis 
for sustaining Mach numbers greater than 2. The design goal 
was a 300 passenger Mach 2.6 vehicle. In 1963 the only 
aircraft able to sustain speeds in excess of 1000 knots were 
a long way fiom meeting the redundancy and safety 
requirements demanded of today's airliner. The second issue 
was that of the environment. Nitrogen Oxide (generically 
NO,)' emissions were thought to be harmful to the upper 
atmosphere, but not until sometime later was the effect of 
the exhaust plume fkom a turbojet aircraft linked to the 
"green house" gases and potential damage to the ozone 
layer. Adding to that were the general issues of "noise 
pollution" and sonic boom. Even if the aircraft was flying 
well into the stratosphere, above 30,000 feet, the large 
footprint of the shock waves fiom the aircraft was disruptive 
and annoying to the public. Whether or not damage would 
occur fiom the shock wave of a heavy jet traveling at Mach 
' Derivatives of Nitrogen and Oxygen combinations 
2 at 50,000 feet, the "possibility" that it might occur could 
not be ruled out. The final factor was, in many minds, the 
deciding one. Economically, the airline industry could not 
foresee making money from an SST. The initial expense for 
the aircraft was on the order of three or four times the cost 
of a subsonic wide body jet. In order to make the operation 
of an SST cost effective, the price per ticket would be 
exorbitant for the tcaveling public. During its time in service 
the Concorde did not turn a profit and the passengers paid 
ten times more for a trans-Atlantic flight than flying coach 
in a Boeing 747. (Darden, 1998) 
The Supersonic Transport was not the only high speed 
research program that NASA was developing. When NACA 
expanded to become the nation's space agency, it was in the 
middle of a decade-long flight research program using 
experimental aircraft. The most successful and advanced 
vehicle of the time was the X-15. This was truly a high 
speed (hypersonic) vehicle. Next in line wase the SR-71 
Mach 3 research vehicle that was loaned to NASA. Nothing 
filled the gap after the X-15 program ended in 1968. The 
SR-71 was not cost effective for the Air Force and NASA 
had difficulty justifying research expenses associated with 
the operational use it its SR-7 1 s. 
In the late 1980s people associated with high-speed flight 
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research, both in and out of government, began to ask, "Was 
technology at the point where a supersonic transport could 
be a viable means of transportation?" The challenges 
identified by the SST might be met given time to apply new 
technology (Rosen, et-al., 1993). 
HSCT BIRTH 
When the Supersonic Transport was cancelled these 
problems confronting the practically use of a high-speed 
commercial aircraft remained unsolved. At the top of the list 
of concerns were the environmental problems that needed 
resolution. In 1988 an effort was begun within NASA to 
h d  ongoing research leading to the resolution of these 
problems and the resurrection of a prototype aircraft. The 
National Research Council reviewed the list of issues that 
NASA proposed to work on. The NRC Board on 
Atmospheric Sciences and Climate listed several areas 
requiring further study. The first was the HSCT's emissions. 
In addition to NO, produced by the engines, the study 
included sulfur dioxide and particulate carbon. Another 
requirement listed was the need to study plumelwake 
processes. In the mid-90s this effort was undertaken using 
aircraft from Arnes Research Center and Langley Research 
Center. The difficulty of getting data on particulate activity 
and the exhaust fiom large jet aircraft was evident from the 
start. Additionally, flight test work was attempted using one 
of the two operational SR-71 s that NASA had available at 
Dryden Flight Research Center. 
In 1988 NASA Headquarters began the preliminary 
h d i n g  of the feasibility studies that would determine if a 
new supersonic transport could be put into service. The 
results of those studies were promising. There were several 
major technical and two economic issues that had to be 
examined. In 1990 the High Speed Research Program was 
begun in NASA. At the time, public awareness of program 
goals was lost in all the background noise fiom the return to 
flight of the Space Shuttle and the new mission to build a 
space station. 
CHALLENGES 
The research work began on all fronts with numerous 
contractors and government entities participating. The 
amazing aspect of this was the cooperation of a variety of 
companies that would normally compete against each other 
to get answers to the questions that had to be addressed 
before anyone could start to build a new supersonic 
transport. 
A list of those concerns associated with these studies 
include: 
A. High speed aerodynamics and large transport 
category aircraft. 
1. Most effective configuration for the airframe - 
Technology Concept Aircraft 
Baseline configuration-canards with 
cranked delta wing 
2. Wind tunnel and CFD work - Mach 2.4 
computational fluid dynamics modeling 
Optimization techniques 
Comparisons to wind tunnel testing 
3. Airfiame design - 
a. OEW (operating empty weight) 
reduction 
Structural loading driven by thermo- 
mechanical and manufacturing 
processes 
60K hour durability at 350' F skin 
friction 
Damage tolerance 
b. High lift devices 
c. External visibility system 
Elimination of droop nose for 
visibility 
B. Propulsion Technology and Exhaust Gas Studies 
1. Engine technologies for sustained M>2 flight 
a. Mixed compression inlets for high 
performance 
b. Thrust cycles 
c. Stage 3 noise reduction drives the 
exhaust sizing 
d. Low nitric oxide (referred to as NO,) 
emissions 
e. 3000 percent increase in operating time 
at max power 
2. Studies and compromises to incorporate 
environmental issues 
a. Nozzle size linked to noise reduction 
High mass flows in subsonic flight 
Long inlet design 
b. Composite materials required 
3500 degree F19000 hour engines 
C. Environmental Impact Studies 
1. Sonic Boom Attenuation - Studies of airfiame 
shape to reduce intensity of shock 
2. Nitric Oxide and Nitrous Oxide Reduction 
3. Noise level reductions 
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D. Market and Business Impacts 
1. Cost of operations 
2. Appeal to large carriers 
These issues were examined in the years 1990 to 1998. 
Wind tunnel tests were run; computational fluid dynamics 
computer models were extensively developed, engine inlet 
and exhaust designs were developed, and a host of other 
aircraft related work was performed. The environmental side 
of the studies included high altitude research of jet engine 
exhausts and a rather extensive study on how to attenuate 
the sonic boom. The question on how the airmft would 
meet the Stage 111 noise requirements that were in effect was 
singularly daunting. How could the design insure that the 
decibel level of the engines exhaust was below the sound of 
highway traffic? Noise reduction was to be a major factor 
in the engine exhaust and nozzle design. Favorable progress 
was made on all of these issues. 
PROGRESS 
A. HIGH SPEED AERODYNAMICS AND LARGE 
TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRCRAFT. 
Structure 
Perhaps the easiest of the technical challenges was to 
design a baseline a i b e  to meet the performance 
requirements expected &om the proposed supersonic 
transport category aircraft. The early decision to use a 
cranked delta wing with engines mounted in pods appears to 
be the logical derivative fiom the original SST work of the 
1960s. It was determined that the United States version of 
this aircraft would not have a droop down nose for visibility 
during landing and takeoff. Therefore the avionics 
requirements for remote visual aids and special displays 
were assumed from the start. 
Two of the challenges were thermomechanical loading 
and the necessity to reduce the structural weight to 
accommodate larger payloads. The first of these, 
thermomechanical loading, is a term that had come into the 
engineering lexicon with the advent of high Mach number 
flight. The combination of the structural strength 
requirements and tbe durability requirements for an aircraft 
to encounter 350°F temperatures for long periods of time 
were difficult. The solution was to use composite materials 
specifically built for this purpose. Carbon fibers in a 
polyimide resin were selected for the major portions of the 
structure, and at the time the program was cancelled the 
analytical portion of the testing was not finished and the 
necessary hardware testing was yet to be accomplished. 
NASA had developed a polyimidecarbon fiber matrix 
composite that was considered to be the answer to this 
design challenge. The airfisune would be largely composed 
of this material (Whitehead; 1999). 
Configuration 
The various configuration changes were set about a 
baseline Technology Concept Airplane (TCA). There were 
various "versions" of this design; principally the differences 
were how much sweep was given to the outer wing of the 
cranked delta and what high lift devices were used. In these 
wind tunnel and CFD tests, the wing area, span, aspect ratio, 
outboard sweep and horizontal tail area were changed. Part 
of the configuration changes included a canard. The final 
configurations, tested by the end of 1998, pointed to a lower 
swept outer wing with canards. The drag count at certain 
coefficients of lift was less, the trim drag was reduced, and 
the use of a variable camber leading edge flap all resulted in 
good possibilities for the configuration (ELzey, et.al; 1999). 
The difficulty with this configuration was that it was not 
conducive to producing a low-pressure sonic boom. The 
design key to reducing the sonic boom impact requires a low 
profile very swept aircraft. "Low-sonic boom design 
features include an mow wing for long lifting length, long 
forebody, staggered nacelles, lifting arrow wing horizontal 
tail, and a smooth overall area distributions." (Boeing; 1989) 
Relief fiom the low sonic boom constraint was driven by the 
inability to predict whether such design efforts could 
achieve the low sonic boom goals. Studies finished to that 
point indicated "Even the low-boom configuration would 
highly annoy over 25 percent of the population." 
(Whitehead, 1999). The requirement to fly supersonic over 
populated areas was dropped and this decision relieved 
those aerodynamic design constraints. By the end of the 
program an efficient aerodynamic design to sustain Mach 
2.4 had been worked out. 
Propulsion 
Early in the program, four challenges associated with the 
propulsion system were somewhat unique to a supersonic 
transport. These included: 
(I) mixed compression inlets that had high safety margins; 
(2) high specific thrust that achieve efficient supersonic 
cruise; 
(3) very low nitric oxide emissions; 
(4) significant improvement in operating times at max 
temperatures and pressures (Whitehead; 1999). 
The constraints of the second and third of these propulsion 
challenges were most difficult. First, to achieve the required 
thrust without exceeding the noise requirements implied a 
careful sizing of the nozzle. Second was the requirement to 
reduce the NO, production to a level designated as an 
equivalent of grams of nitric oxide production per kilogram 
of fuel less than five. This ratio of nitric oxide to weight of 
fuel is 5 x 10". (EPA: 2001) The Concorde SST was used as 
a sample emitter and the target for the HSCT was 
considerably less than that sample. The Concorde index for 
NO, was 20 compared to the HSCT target of 5. 
Comparisons to the Concorde performance in these latter 
two areas show how much work was going to have to be 
accomplished in the design of the engine to meet these tight 
constraints. At the time there was no equivalent military 
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fanjet engine capable of meeting all the design requirements 
placed upon the HSCT. 
Inlets 
-
By establishing a baseline configuration early on, the 
engine designers could address these challenges in order. 
Research that was conducted identified that a two- 
dimensional bifurcated inlet would be the baseline. This 
inlet was essentially a two-dimensional split inlet duct 
leading into the engine fan section (Plencer, et.al.; 1998). 
The downside of using such a design was the increase in 
drag and weight, but in all other respects this 2-D inlet had 
advantages over the "translating or variable diameter" center 
body-inlet plug design. I 
Nozzle 
The choice of a nozzle baseline was more difficult as the 
noise reduction criteria determined the size and 
configuration. The need to sustain supersonic flight and 
operate efficiently at low subsonic speeds dictated a long 
nozzle and hence a long engine. The outcome of the studies 
accomplished under the management of Glenn Research 
Center resulted in a two-dimensional mixer-ejector nozzle. 
Core eirgine 
The severe operating condition for this engine dictated a 
high operating temperature for a long time requiring ceramic 
matrix components for the combustion section. 
Development of these composite components was well 
under way when the program was cancelled. Compounding 
the design problem was the requirement for active cooling 
air within the combustion chambers, and this mixing 
changes the chemistry that is important for low nitric oxide 
emissions. 
The turbine components would have to be of a composite 
material. One material that was being developed consisted 
of an oxidation resistant nickel-based super-alloy but this 
material was not, at the end of the program, selected as the 
definite choice (Mecure, 2000). 
Nacelles and engine mounting 
The Technology Concept Aircraft (TCA) configuration 
selected placed the four engines in individual pods mounted 
beneath the wings. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL 
The two attempts to develop a supersonic transport 
aircraft in the United States were plagued by an 
unprecedented demand that the aircraft be environmentally 
safe. The political sensitivities of the environmental issues 
could not be ignored and the greatest challenge to the 
designers meeting the very specific environmental 
requirements. There was some debate about the validity of 
these requirements in protecting the atmosphere, but the 
propaganda effects of not attending to them in the design the 
HSCT would have, in all likelihood, stopped the program. 
As it turned out, the politics hung on the cost of such a 
development and less on the program's technical factors. 
There were four areas of concern for the HSCT: airport 
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community noise, stratospheric ozone depletion, sonic boom 
impact, crewlpassenger radiation exposure. 
The technical design challenges to meet specific 
requirements for each of these was mentioned earlier in this 
document, with the exception of the crewlpassenger 
radiation exposure concern. The studies accomplished under 
the HSR program, in concert with European and Japanese 
air-carrier industry representatives, produced documents and 
data indicating the problem of high altitude radiation 
exposure as a legitimate concern. The High Speed Research 
program addressed the particulars of atmospheric ionizing 
radiation (AIR) in an attempt to determine the threat to 
aircrews and passengers. The primary concern was with 
high-energy neutrons at altitudes above 50,000 feet. 
Samples taken by NASA ER-2 aircra* in 1997 were to be 
analyzed by the Department of Energy. The current view is 
that crews of all commercial air transports are classified as 
radiation workers by the EPA, the FAA, and the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection 
(Whitehead, et.al.; 1999). In effect, this means that all 
aircrews should be monitored for their exposure to high 
altitude radiation. However, as ofthe end of2000 there were 
no international regulations that applied to aircrew exposure. 
This is a problem that has to be addressed in future years. 
Without fiuther study, there are neither guidelines nor 
requirements placed upon designers to provide "radiation 
proof' cockpits and cabins. Currently the only guide 
available is one that applies to ground-based workers 
exposed to radiation. At the latitudes the HSCT was 
expected to operate, there would be restrictions on flight 
hour exposure time. 
The Ozone Factor 
A 1995 preliminary report for NASA indicated a concern 
for the amount of NO, that would be released at the altitudes 
near the location where the ozone layer is formed. The study 
of the ozone layer and the effects of hydrocarbon emissions 
on the breakdown of this layer have been on going for 
several decades. NASA had a primary role in the upper 
atmospheric sampling that determined the extent of this 
breakdown. In the winter of 1988189 indications of a major 
depletion of ozone over the upper latitudes of the Atlantic 
was discovered by NASA scientists flying airborne research 
aircraft out of Ames Research Center. As more information 
was gathered over the next several years, the conclusions 
about that region of ozone depletion were not conclusive 
enough to alter the belief that the HCST would not further 
damage the upper atmosphere. In any case, the goal for the 
HSCT was to have emissions well below that of the current 
air traffic that crisscrosses the Atlantic. It would mean 
programmatic suicide for any high altitude aircraft design 
team not to attempt to reduce the emissions of nitric oxide. 
The ER-2 is a modified USAF U-2R aircraft that was flown 
out of Moffett Field, CA and now Edwards, CA. It was ideally 
suited to study the AIR at the altitudes required. 
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The impact on the ozone layer remains to be fully 
understood after decades of jet aircraft flying between 
25,000 and 40,000 feet across the same airway systems in 
the northern hemisphere. NASA commissioned a report 
from the Environmental Protection Agency to address the 
projected "modeling" of ozone depletion predicted 6-om a 
flget of 1000 to 1500 HSCTs in the mid-21" Century (EPA, 
2001). This report relied heavily on the work an earlier 
study by NASA (Kawa, et.al. 1999). The Kawa work 
reported primarily on modeling of ozone, depletion and 
estimates of the impact of the chemistry changes that a fleet 
of HSCTs might contribute to in the upper atmosphere. 
Based on the lack of real data the report leayes doubt. The 
conclusion stated that an increase in skim cancer would 
probably occur over a period of time due to supersonic 
transports, and the incidence of melanoma and skin cancer 
mortality would be significantly greater than had there been 
no HSCT fleet. These reports taken as a whole have created 
an impediment to political support for the HSCT. 
The Sonic Boom 
The attempt to eliminate the annoyance of the sonic boom 
over populated areas was unsuccessful for several reasons. 
The results are summed up in the statement: "The design 
effort did result in significantly reduced sonic boom 
pressure levels on the earth's surface, but there was also a 
reduction in aerodynamic performance" (Whitehead, 1999). 
Technically this had to do with preventing what was termed 
the N wave from forming. The N wave is the shape of the 
pressure pattern that results as all of the shock waves 
forming on surfaces of the aircraft coalesce into a region of 
one high pressure wave. NASA flight test studies showed 
how the N wave is formed. Subsequently, researchers 
applied various aerodynamic shapes to reduce the amplitude 
of the wave. Using the existing and predicted data, studies 
were begun to determine the acceptability of the reduced 
sonic boom wave. These studies were more on the nature of 
surveys of public opinion. Their results were not 
scientifically conclusive, but the indication was that a 
significant proportion of the population affected would be 
"highly annoyed". 
It might bear pointing out that a large number of people 
who live in homes or apartments near major airports are also 
highly annoyed. One might make the observation that 
restricted routes for supersonic flight over the continental 
United States would result in better statistical analysis. The 
final plan was not to fly supersonic over the inland of the 
United States. 
One further note about the acceptability of the sonic boom 
can be made. The question arose as to the affect ofthe boom 
on sea life. Since all of the supersonic flights would be made 
over the oceans they might be harmful to sea animals. 
Because the over pressure levels of a sonic boom may reach 
12 pounds per square inch there could be reason for concern. 
However, the attenuation of the shock wave through water 
is such that at depths of 15 or more feet it is negligible. On 
shallow coastal waters the results of the study indicated that 
the sonic boom would have no affect on sea mammals 
(Darden; 1998). 
The methodology for determining this response was from 
a study of gray seals that were exposed to three sonic booms 
per day. There was another study to be undertaken in 1998 
that would look at the behavior of harbor seals. Such studies 
indicate the extent of even this environmental concern upon 
design constraints. 
WHAT MAY REMAIN TO BE ACCOMPLISHED 
The work on solving the issues associated with these 
design challenges would have continued had not the HSR 
program been cancelled. In the synopsis given above, 
several areas can be identified that might have been 
contributory to private industry had they been h d e d  to 
completion. The most important of these with respect to 
future high-speed research can be tentatively identified. 
A. Continued development of a polyimide-carbon 
fiber matrix for use as structure in large transport 
category aircraft. 
B. Continued research on sonic boom abatement. 
C. Build and test full-scale supersonic cruise 
engine with low noise and NO, emissions. 
D. Continue with detailed studies and 
experimentation (using military aircraft) in the area 
of noise around large airports. 
E. Continue search for direct evidence that jet 
engine exhaust emissions have an affect upon the 
ozone layer. 
F. Develop aircraft structure (skin, windows, etc.) 
to protect crew and passengers fiom harmful 
radiation. 
G. Make final determination of permissible 
exposure rates to AIR. 
H. Prototype a scaled down HSCT or RPV version 
for demonstration of flight and handling qualities. 
I. Revisit the health impacts studies once a better 
understanding of the effect of engine exhaust upon 
the ozone is known. 
CONCLUSION 
At the present time, the U.S. aerospace industry is in the 
doldrums. The airline industry is suffering with banlavptcies 
and deficits. There are only a few major aircraft 
manufacturing companies still producing aircraft. The 
competition 6-om Europe's aerospace industry is intense. 
Boeing Corporation has recognized the advantages of higher 
speeds for today's commercial transport category aircraft 
and has elected to produce a high transonic speed airliner 
that is a departure h m  the standard configuration of the 
transport jet aircraft that have been built since the rollout of 
the Boeing 707 about 45 years ago. The shutdown of the 
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HSR effectively stopped investment by industry into high 
speed flight for public transportation. What is more 
pernicious is that the ending of the research program halted 
the work being accomplished on several important technical 
challenges, any of which could revitalize certain parts of the 
industry. 
Apart from the High Speed Civil Transport NASA was 
conducting other studies and development work under HSR. 
One program was called Hyper-X and was later Christened 
the X-43. NASA management had hoped to develop a 
hypersonic, Mach 7-10 test vehicle that would utilize 
scramjet technology in the first decade of the 21n century. 
This program had an ignominious start after a five-year 
design and manufacturing process. The first flight test ended 
in failure when the Pegasus rocket carrying the test vehicle 
lost one of its control fins and was destroyed (Smith: 200 1). 
The first successfid flight test did not occur until the spring 
of 2004 and funding for advanced versions of the X-43 is in 
question. (Shelleck: 2004) 
Yet the heart of the program was the HSCT and the void 
in its development keeps the US aerospace industry tethered 
to a veZy old technology and aircraft design. The ending of 
the HSR program left several research teams working with 
no clear purpose. Expectations for the research were 
affected. Had NASA continued funding of the work on the 
HSCT it seems possible the aerospace industry and the 
flying public would have benefited. The list of possible 
outcomes of continued research on the HSCT serves to 
illustrate what might have been. 
1. There was risk involved in continuing the 
program but that risk was only financial. Given the 
capabilities of aerospace today, it is clear that the work 
being accomplished during the ten years the HSCT was 
h d e d  would have produced an aircraft capable of 
demonstrating a design success over the challenges that 
existed when the United States ended the SST program 30 
years ago. The systematic approach taking place on the 
HSCT had already succeeded in designing the Technology 
Concept Aircraft that offered promise. This TCA, or a 
derivative of it, was capable of meeting the operational 
requirements over intercontinental high-speed air travel. 
2. The airframe structural development, had it 
continued, would be a significant step in developing 
materials and manufacturing techniques applicable to any 
supersonic large category aircraft. Since the introduction 
into composite materials use in the 1960s and 1970s an 
entire new industry has matured; and where once composite 
aircraft parts were difficult to manufacture and maintain, 
today such processes are routine. 
3. The work that was accomplished on the 
propulsion system for this aircraft was perhaps further along 
than any other part of the development. Today large engines 
producing very high t h t  to weight ratios are available. Of 
all the aspects of the HSCT, the engine development would 
have had a significant positive impact on the commercial 
aviation industry. Overcoming the noise and emissions 
problems would have allowed airframe designers more 
options in building new transport category aircraft. 
4. Today the fully automated, fly-by-wire, glass 
cockpit, transport category aircraft is operational. 
Application of this technology to the HSCT would have 
ushered in the era of fully automated flight operations. Such 
aircratt, either subsonic or supersonic, will in the hture not 
require man-rated skills in order to operate. This would have 
been a necessity in the HSCT, but one that is already 
projected for the future of the air carrier business. The 
HSCT design would have advanced full automation 
(autonomous flight) that today is being applied to all types 
of aircraft 6om both manned and unmanned. 
5. A few prototype HSCTs would have given the 
aerospace industry the opportunity to pick up where it left 
off in the design of high performance commercial aircraft. 
In the 1990s, NASA attempted to create a Reusable Launch 
Vehicle (RLV) or single stage to orbit space plane. The 
technical issues were more difficult than had been 
anticipated, and the program ended after a lack of progress. 
In the past year the idea was resurrected under the 
President's space initiative. It has been argued by flight test 
and aero researchers that had we continued the steady pace 
of high speed transport development fiom the 1970s to the 
present, many of the technical problems would already have 
been addressed; and at the least the United States would 
have built and flown large high speed aircraft that could be 
used as test beds for further development of an RLV. The 
SR-7 1 and the X-15 were at the leading edge of that work 
30 years ago. Today we do not have such test aircraft 
available. 
The US aerospace industry has been through this pattern 
before. Had the last two Presidential Administrations seen 
fit to at least continue with the projects already in progress 
under the HSR, the gap between what was learned and what 
we might have achieved would not be as great as it is now. 
The burden of continuing research was more than any single 
company was willing to bear. The political factor was more 
devastating. NASA Eailed to convince the Office of 
Management and Budget in 1997 that the HSCT was worth 
pursuing from a technological as well as economic basis. 
The response 6om the single major airhme manufacturer, 
Boeing, was equally damaging to the hopes of continuing 
the HSCT development. NASA's Administrator at the time, 
Dan Goldin, was unable to convince industry to continue 
fundiig the necessary work. 
Each of the developmental projects listed should have 
been continued with federal support. What could we learn 
about carbon-polyimide composites as structural material? 
Was the combustion chamber design for the engine capable 
of meeting the sustained high temperatures that were 
required? Would the actual ratio of NO, to fuel burned be 
Page 14 JAAER, Fall 2004 
6
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 [2004], Art. 5
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol14/iss1/5
High Speed Research 
acceptable? Is there a significant cause and effect 
relationship between jet engine exhaust and ozone 
depletion? Would supersonic flight at 50,000 feet cause the 
sonic boom to be a real problem or would it have been no 
worse than the sound of a subsonic jet flying at 30,000 feet 
over populated areas? Can we produce large thrust engines 
t4at meet stage I11 requirements? 
This paper does not mention the potential economic 
variables associated with the HSCT; they may be the only 
monumental task remaining. The work done to meet the 
technical requirements for a supersonic transport seems to 
show progress in all directions. Had the funding continued 
it could have been proven that there were no technical 
problems which would have prevented the introduction of 
such an aircraft into operations. Only the costs of 
development and initial operation would have been the 
deciding factor. One day we will ask why we didn't find 
out..) 
Randolph Reynolds holds a Master of Science in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Arizona and a Bachelor of 
Science in Engineering Sciences from the United States Air Force Academy. He is currently a faculty member of the,Embry- 
Riddle Aeronautical University Prescott campus. Mr. Reynolds spent three years as Associate Dean and Interim Dean of the 
School and later College of Aviation. He received a fellowship fiom NASA in 1993 that applied to graduate studies in optics 
and spectroscopy. Mr. Reynolds has extensive experience as a USAF pilot primarily in fighter aircraft. He completed a tour in 
fighter-bombers (F-105s) over North Vietnam and later flew as an F-105 and F-4 Instructor Pilot. In 1988 he joined NASA at 
the Ames Reseafch Center in California as an engineer and research pilot and finished his government career at NASA Dryden 
Flight Research Center in 1999. He retired from the Air Force after 30 years of commissioned service in 1994. 
JAAER, Fall 2004 Page 15 
7
Reynolds: An Overview of the Demise of NASA’s High Speed Research Program
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2004
High Speed Research 
REFERENCES 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, High Soeed Civil Transport Study, NASA Contractor Rewrt 4233, NASA Langley Research 
Center, VA, 1989. 
Elzey, Michael B., Griffiths, Robert C, TCA-4fNASA473 Test Results. 1999 NASA High Soeed Research P r o m  
Aerodynamic Performance Worksho~, Volume I1 - High Lift, NASA CP-1999-209704, Langley Research Center, 
VA., December, 1999. 
Darden, Christine M., Affordable. Acceotable Suoersonic Flight; Is it Near?, Paper No. 1L1, 16& International Session in 40h 
Aircraft Symposium, Yokohama, Japan, Oct 9-1 1,2002. 
Darden, Christine M., An Overview of NASA's HSR Program: Environmental Issues and Economic Concerns, 1998 
European Community on Computational Metho& in Applied Sciences, Athens, Greece, Sep 7- 1 1, 1998. 
Kawa, S. Randolph, Assessment of the Effects of H i ~ h  Soeed Aircraft in the Stratosphere: 1998, NASAITP-1999-209237, 
Goddard Space Flight Center, MD, 1999. 
Mecure, Robert A., NASA's HSCT-Past and Future Prospects, International Gas Turbine and Aero-engine Congress and 
Ejchibition, Munich, Germany, May 8-1 1,2000. 
NASA-Facts, NASA's High-Soeed Research P r o m .  Develooing a Future Suoersonic Passenger Jet, FS-1998-05- 15-LaRC, 
May 1998. 
Plencner, Robert M. et.al., Engine Technologv Challenges for the High Soeed Civil Transwrt Plane, NASA/TM-1998- 
208405, Lewis (Glenn) Research Center, Ohio, December, 1998. 
Rosen, Robert and Williams, Louis J., The Rebirth of Su~ersonic Transport, Technology Review, FebIMar, 1993. 
Smith, Bruce, Elevon failure  recedes loss of first X-34A. Aviation Week and Space Technology v. 154 no. 24, pp. 50-5 1, 
June 11,2001. 
Schleck, Dave, NASA's 'scramiet' fkding in ieooardy. The Daily Press, Newport News, VA, June 4,2004. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Human Health Eff'ects of Ozone Depletion from Stratosuheric Aircraft, NASA /CR 
200 1 -2 1 1 160, Glenn Research Center, Ohio, September, 200 1. 
Whitehead, Allen H. Jr., Impact of Environmental Issues on the High Smed Civil Transwrt, NASA document 199900 18244, 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA, 1999. 
Whitehead, Allen H. Jr., Status of NASA High-Soeed Research P r o m ,  NASA document 1999001 8242, NASA Langley 
Research Center, Hampton, VA, 1999. 
Page 16 JAAER, Fall 2004 
8
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 [2004], Art. 5
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol14/iss1/5
